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The Future of the Steel Voluntary
Restraint Agreements
ROYAL DANIEL III*
MITCHELL S. Ross**
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States policy toward protecting its domestic steel in-
dustry since the late 1960s has been one of trial and error. Limits on
imported steel first began with the original Voluntary Restraint
Agreements ("VRA") in the cases of Japan and the European Eco-
nomic Community.' Since then, the United States steel import regu-
latory regime has taken different forms, seeking to further a dual
purpose of protecting the domestic steel industry and pacifying
United States foreign trading partners.
The steel VRA contract term expires in September of 1989 and
the congressional authority (political leverage) for the current version
of the steel VRAs expires in November of 1989.2 Both critics and
supporters of the VRAs have questioned the future of steel trade pol-
icy and whether the current regime of Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments should be extended. 3 This question comes at a crucial
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1. E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 495 (1986).
2. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 806(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988). The con-
gressional authority for the steel quotas expires in November of 1989. Id. This does not pre-
clude executive authority to enter into bilateral agreements. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). Congress has
made it clear, however, that absent some protection for the domestic steel industry, it would
consider unilaterally imposing mandatory quotas on its own initiative. Steel Import Stabiliza-
tion Act, § 803(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
3. See 134 CONG. REC. E2446 (daily ed. July 14, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Murtha) (sta-
ting that Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, along with the United Steelworkers of
America and the member companies of the American Iron and Steel Institute support exten-
sion of the VRA program); 134 CONG. REC. E2570 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (remarks of Rep.
Schulze) (arguing that there is an "underlying need to continue [steel] modernization and to
extend voluntary restraint agreements with our major trading partners"). Supporters of VRA
extension generally believe that the domestic steel industry continues to need relief from im-
ports in order to fully modernize. Id.
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economic time for the domestic steel industry. It will also be an early
test for the Bush administration and new Democratic Congress,4 who
must rapidly formulate the best approach to steel trade policy.5
This article discusses the current limitations on steel imports, the
Voluntary Restraint Agreements. Part I reviews the development of
steel trade policy and the problems that have arisen since the late
1960s. Part II analyzes the current steel Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments and the concurrent congressional authority for those agree-
ments, the Steel Import Stabilization Act. Part III discusses the
mechanics of the steel Voluntary Restraint Agreements and problems
not foreseen by the architects of the agreements. Part IV analyzes the
current state of the domestic steel industry and its political position.
Part V describes the resiliency of quota systems in general and dis-
cusses why the VRA system will continue. Part VI argues that a do-
mestic subsidy regime would be more sensitive to the needs of
consumers while at the same time protecting the domestic steel indus-
try. Part VI also reviews other advantages of a subsidy regime over
the present VRA system. Based on economic, political, and policy
considerations, the system of steel voluntary restraint agreements
seems destined to continue.
II. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES STEEL TRADE POLICY
SINCE 1968
A. The United States-Japan-EC Voluntary Restraint Agreements
Voluntary Restraint Agreements 6 were first instituted as a re-
sponse to increased steel imports into the United States in the 1960s. 7
From 1961 to 1968, steel imports climbed nearly 600 percent, reach-
ing 16.7 percent of the domestic market by 1968.8 In response to
pressure from the domestic steel industry9 and from Congress10 for
4. Wartzman & Hymowitz, Big Steel is Back, but Upturn is Costly and May Not Last,
Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1988, at A4, col. 2.
5. Powell, Flood the Market With Choice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, § III at 2, col. 3.
6. A voluntary restraint agreement is defined as a "negotiated agreement whereby an
exporting country voluntarily agrees to limit its exports by means of legislation or other man-
ner of enforcement within the exporting country." Note, Voluntary Restraint Agreements: Ef-
fects and Implications of the Steel and Auto Cases, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 101, 102
(1986).
7. See Note, The Voluntary Quota System for Regulating Steel Imports, 14 VA. J. INT'L
L. 101 (1973) (discussing the detailed negotiations that resulted in the VRAs).
8. Id. at 103-04.
9. Id. at 104.
10. Id.
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relief from steel imports, the President negotiated Voluntary Re-
straint Agreements with Japanese and European steel producers.
These producers agreed to restrict steel imports to specified maximum
tonnages. "
President Nixon regarded VRAs as a more palatable alternative
than legislated mandatory quotas, for a number of reasons. First, uni-
lateral quotas have the potential of provoking retaliation from United
States trading partners.12 Second, President Nixon sought to avoid
creating internal political problems for the governments of trading
partners, as instability created by external trade restrictions could ad-
versely affect United States interests.' 3 Third, it was thought gener-
ally that unilateral mandatory quotas might violate a number of
provisions and the spirit of the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"),' 4 which generally forbids discriminatory import re-
strictions and discourages quotas.15
B. The Constitutionality of the Voluntary Restraint Agreement
The United States-Japan Voluntary Restraint Agreement with-
stood constitutional challenge in 1974. In Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Kissinger,'6 a consumer organization sued to challenge
the President's authority to make VRAs.' 7 Specifically, Consumers
Union argued that the executive could not regulate foreign commerce
without a delegation from Congress,' 8 and hence, the VRA was a reg-
ulation of commerce in contravention of the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. 9
The court agreed that the President cannot change tariffs, issue
orders to the customs authority to delay imports, or impose
11. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 138-39 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
12. Note, supra note 6, at 103.
13. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 138.
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 61 Stat. (Pt. 5), T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article II of the GATT prohibits parties from
raising negotiated tariffs, and Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions on imports. It re-
mains questionable whether VRAs are consistent with the GATT. See Savage and Horlick,
United States Voluntary Restraint Agreements: Practical Considerations and Policy Recom-
mendations, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281, 294-98 (1985) (arguing for an objective determination of
injury as a prerequisite for validity of a VRA under the GATT).
15. Note, supra note 7, at 105.
16. 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 137-38.
18. Id. at 142.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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mandatory quotas without a congressional delegation of the power to
regulate foreign commerce. 20 The court, however, distinguished the
VRA from "contracts [or] governmental actions with the force of
law," describing VRAs as merely a "statement of intent" on the part
of foreign steel producers.
2'
The court held that the VRAs are precatory in nature, and not
an enforceable import restriction.22 Further, although Congress has
the power to regulate enforceable import restrictions, this power does
not preclude the executive from seeking "assurances of voluntary re-
straint" from foreign steel producers.
23
Generally, the constitutionality of the executive agreement is rec-
ognized by Congress under the Case Act, which requires that the Sec-
retary of State transmit the text of the agreement to Congress for
informational purposes only.24 In some instances, Congress requires
by legislation that it must approve an executive agreement. 25 Such
congressionally approved executive agreements have inherent advan-
tages over treaties. The agreements can be approved by a simple ma-
jority in both houses.26 The two-thirds of the Senate needed to
approve a treaty27 is not necessary. The U.S.-Japan VRA and the
current steel VRAs with the approval of Congress fit into this pat-
tern.28 Since Consumers Union, a different VRA has also survived
constitutional challenge. 2
9
C. The Antitrust Problem
Private VRAs pose a threat of antitrust liability.30 If a VRA has
no congressional sanction and is not entered into with a foreign gov-
20. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 142-43.
21. Id. at 143.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1982).
25. See, e.g., Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d) (1982) (authorizing the President to
negotiate an international subsidies code with foreign nations).
26. P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 541-44 (1988).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
28. P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 54144 (1988).
29. See Klockner, Inc. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)
(upholding the constitutionality of the voluntary restraint agreement regarding steel imports
between the United States and the European Coal and Steel Community).
30. The plaintiffs in the Consumers Union case also argued that the VRA violates United
States antitrust laws. The plaintiffs, however, voluntarily dismissed the antitrust claim from
the case. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 140-41 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
490 [Vol. 11:487
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ernment (i.e. is not an executive agreement with another country), the
agreement is private and therefore subject to antitrust laws. 31 Volun-
tary Restraint Agreements are actually market allocation agree-
ments-agreements that restrict imports to a certain percentage of the
United States market-which are per se illegal. 32 VRAs, however, are
thought to be shielded from antitrust liability by the "foreign sover-
eign compulsion" defense of the act of state doctrine. 33 If a VRA is
entered into by both governments, an exporter can escape antitrust
liability if his government requires private party compliance with
VRA export limitations.3 4 The 1968 VRA with Japan was not for-
mally executed by the Japanese government, thus raising the antitrust
claim in Consumers Union.3
5
Since the current steel VRAs require that the foreign VRA signa-
tories enforce export limitations through export licenses,36 the foreign
sovereigns do require compliance with VRA limitations3 7 and the for-
eign sovereign compulsion defense would apply. In addition, since
Congress has enacted the Steel Import Stabilization Act, giving tacit
approval to the VRAs, this action arguably cloaks the VRA with im-
plicit antitrust immunity.38
D. The Trigger Price Mechanism
Steel import pressure eased between 1975-1978. 39 In 1978, how-
ever, steel imports rose to 18.1 percent of the United States market.4°
In response to the increase in imports and a dramatic increase in steel
industry petitions for relief under countervailing duty and antidump-
ing laws,4 1 the Department of the Treasury under Anthony Solomon
31. United States v. Socony Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-27 (1940).
32. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
33. Under the act of state doctrine, a United States court will not examine the validity of
an act performed by a foreign sovereign in its own territory. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
34. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
35. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 139-40 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
36. Notice of Arrangement Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products Between the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community and the United States, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058, 49,062 (1982)
[hereinafter US-EC VRA].
37. Id.
38. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
39. Note, supra note 6, at 110.
40. Id.
41. Id. "By the fall of 1977, nineteen separate steel industry petitions involving steel
products were before the Treasury Department-'an unprecedented number with respect to a
1989]
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implemented the trigger price mechanism ("TPM"), which estab-
lished a minimum fair import price.42 Any significant steel imports
below this price were subject to a "fast track" antidumping investiga-
tion by the Treasury Department. 43 In exchange for the TPM pro-
gram, the steel industry dropped its antidumping complaints.
44
Although the TPM initially caused a reduction in imports from
1978 to 1980, import penetration had begun to rise again by the end
of 1980. 45 Perceiving government incompetence in implementing and
enforcing the TPM program and with no apparent relief in sight, the
steel industry once more brought a large number of antidumping
cases and countervailing duty cases. 46 In response, President Carter
suspended the TPM program. The domestic steel industry then
brought an action against European producers of carbon steel to ob-
tain relief from unfair trade practices.47 President Reagan responded
by indicating that the International Trade Commission ("ITC")
ought to investigate whether the imports threaten "serious injury"
under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.48 Bethlehem Steel Com-
pany and the United Steelworkers promptly petitioned for import re-
lief under that provision of the law.
49
The present enabling legislation for the steel VRA followed two
affirmative determinations of injury by the International Trade Com-
single industry within so short a time frame'." Note, Protecting Steel: Time For A New Ap-
proach, 96 HARV. L. REV. 866, 875 (1983).
42. Id. The minimum price was based on the costs of the world's most efficient producer,
Japan, plus an allowance for profit. Id. at 876.
43. Id.
44. Id. The technical changes in the antidumping calculation mandated by the Trade
Act of 1974 simply overwhelmed the Department of Commerce, who at the time lacked the
administrative capacity to investigate the pending antidumping complaints. As a result, the
Department of Commerce required the domestic antidumping petitioners to drop their com-
plaints as a precondition for TPM implementation. Id. at 876-77. See also Davis-Walker v.
Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978) (upheld the administrative authority for the
TPM).
45. Note, supra note 6, at 110-11.
46. Comment, The Anatomy of Protectionism: The Voluntary Restraint Agreements on
Steel Imports, 35 UCLA L. REV. 953, 972 (1988).
47. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,107 (1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 35,387 (1982).
48. President Ronald Reagan, Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative:
Determination Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 18 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1489 (Nov. 16, 1982). This was a unique response that was criticized at the time. It
appears inconsistent that an investigation originating as an allegation of unfair trade practices
would culminate in relief resulting from recommendations from the International Trade Com-
mission under a statute designed to grant relief for injury caused by fairly priced imports.
49. Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-51, at
4 (July 1984) [hereinafter Carbon and Alloy Steel Products Determination].
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mission5 ° under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.51 In both deter-
minations, the ITC recommended a combination of quotas and tariffs
as a remedy for the injured domestic steel industry.5 2 Specifically, the
ITC determined that injury to the domestic steel industry would be
removed if steel import penetration were limited to eighteen percent.
The ITC determination placed the Reagan Administration-and its
strong free trade orientation-in a difficult position. Under the law,
the President was compelled to either implement the ITC's recom-
mendations or to determine that they were not in the the national
economic interest. 53 Accordingly, President Reagan's free market
ideology was threatened by pressure from the steel industry for
greater protection. The choice to utilize the VRA was viewed by
President Reagan as a middle position between imposing no trade re-
strictions to assist the domestic steel industry and resorting to out-
right quotas or surcharges permitted under section 201. 54 Part of the
benefit of the VRA approach was that it could reach products not
covered under the section 201 investigation.
III. THE STEEL IMPORT STABILIZATION ACT: THE CURRENT
REGIME OF UNITED STATES STEEL TRADE POLICY
A. Legislative History of the Steel Voluntary Restraint Agreements
On September 18, 1984, the President determined that the grant-
ing of import relief in the form of tariff surcharges or quotas was not
in the national economic interest. 55 Consequently, the President au-
thorized the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") to negoti-
ate voluntary restraint arrangements with countries whose exports to
the United States had increased significantly in recent years.56 The
congressional response to this decision was the Steel Import Stabiliza-
tion Act, as part of Title VIII of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. 57
50. Eg., id.; Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, USITC Pub. 1377, Inv. No. TA-201-48
(May 1983) [hereinafter Stainless Steel and Tool Steel Products Determination].
51. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1984).
52. Carbon and Alloy Steel Products Determination, supra note 49, at 2-3; Stainless Steel
and Tool Products Determination, supra note 50, at 1-4.
53. Trade Act of 1974, § 202, 19 U.S.C. § 2252 (1982).
54. Comment, supra note 46, at 981-84.
55. 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813-14 (1984).
56. Monthly Report on the Status of the Steel Industry, USITC Pub. No. 2088, Inv. No.
332-226, at vi (June 1988) [hereinafter JUNE 1988 ITC STEEL REPORT].
57. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 801, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988). In addition to
the congressional action, and as a condition to the VRAs, domestic steel producers withdrew
pending antidumping petitions against those countries that had been the subject of affirmative
1989]
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The Act was in reality a bargaining chip for the President. It is
clear that the President can impose across-the-board quotas under
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.58 Section 201 does not, how-
ever, permit the President to impose discriminatory quotas against
individual countries. The Act puts more strength in the President's
bargaining position because it carries a congressional mandate to im-
pose export limitations on particular countries.
1. Reasons for the Steel Import Stabilization Act
Congress enacted the 1984 legislation because the United States
steel industry needed to make substantial capital commitments in
modernization in order to restore its international competitiveness.
5 9
The main reasons cited by Congress for the decline in the domestic
steel industry included increases in trade and budget deficits, a strong
dollar abroad, foreign governmental subsidies for steel producers, and
sales of products in the United States for less than fair value
("dumping"). 6o
Congress concluded that the best remedy for the steel industry,
consistent with United States foreign policy considerations, would be
executive branch action through political and diplomatic channels,
rather than unilateral action (i.e. mandatory quotas-either legislated
or resulting from a section 201 finding).61 The House Ways and
Means Committee felt, as did President Nixon just twelve years
before, that the negotiation of bilateral restraints would avoid retalia-
tion by United States trading partners and avoid harm to United
States exporters.
62
The stated goals of the legislation were to supplement executive
authority by explicitly granting enforcement power to the President,
while at the same time, requiring modernization on the part of the
steel industry. 63 The protective framework is expressly tied to a steel
determinations by the International Trade Commission. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F.
Supp. 60, 71 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). For example, antidumping duty orders were dropped for
pipes and tubes exported to the United States from Korea (and other countries) in accordance
with a U.S.-Korea VRA. Hyundai Pipe Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 650 F. Supp.
174 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
58. Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1984).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1089, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5189, 5190 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5190.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 5189.
494 [Vol. 11:487
Steel Voluntary Restraint Agreements
industry commitment to engage in modernization. 64 Congress specifi-
cally provided in the legislation that if the VRA strategy fails to pro-
vide relief to the domestic industry, unilateral congressional action
involving mandatory quotas would most likely follow. 65
2. Statutory Authority and Legislative Definition of Voluntary
Restraint Agreements
The Steel Import Stabilization Act authorizes the President to
take all necessary actions to enforce VRAs.66 This authority was
made intentionally broad, to enable the President to enter into a wide
variety of agreements. 67 "Bilateral arrangement," as defined by the
Act, means any arrangement agreed to by the United States and a
foreign country or customs union (e.g. European Community) that
contains quantitative limitations or other restrictions on exports of
carbon and steel alloy products to the United States.68 Congress set
the target at 17.0 to 20.2 percent as the overall national average im-
port share of the domestic market.
69
a. Congressional Choice of VRAs
Congress preferred VRAs over mandatory, across-the-board
quotas for a number of reasons. First, the President publicly commit-
ted the United States to a more vigorous policy of enforcement with
respect to unfair trade practices, thus reducing the perceived need for
quotas.70 Second, the major steel producers reacted favorably to the
President's decision to negotiate VRAs. 71 Third, negotiation of bilat-
eral restraints reduces the possibility of retaliation that might occur in
response to unilateral, mandatory quotas. 72 Finally, VRAs are tied to
an ongoing steel industry commitment to modernize its plants and
provide economic safeguards and retraining opportunities to its
64. It is clear that renewal of VRA authorization will hinge on a steel industry showing
that a substantial effort of modernization has taken place. The largest domestic steel trade
association, the American Iron and Steel Institute ("AISI") reports, through its "Steel Com-
ments" publication, that the steel industry has done so. This point is examined infra.
65. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 803, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988). This tie-in to
industry modernization encouraged critics of import quotas to support the legislation, because
they were satisfied that the domestic steel industry was not getting "something for nothing."
66. Id. § 805.
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 59, at 5197.
68. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 804(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
69. Id. § 803(1).
70. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 59, at 5190.
71. Id.
72. Id.
1989]
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workers. 73
b. Extension of Statutory Authority
The VRAs and the statutory authority for them terminates in
1989. The statute provides for termination one year following enact-
ment unless the President makes an "affirmative annual determina-
tion" that: (A) the major steel companies, taken as a whole,
(i) attempted to reinvest and modernize through investment in mod-
em plant and equipment and used substantially all of their cash flow
to do so; (ii) took action to maintain international competitiveness,
including action to control costs of production and employment and
to improve productivity, and (B) the major steel companies commit-
ted not less than one percent of net cash flow to retraining workers
where there is unemployment in steel operations, and (C) the enforce-
ment authority remains necessary to eliminate unfair trade prac-
tices. 74 Unless the President determines otherwise, the statutory
authority does not terminate until the full five year period has run.75
With respect to steel company reinvestment and modernization,
the ten major steel companies reported that for the 1986-1987 period,
net cash flow totaled $710.7 million, and net steel related expenditures
amounted to $608.6 million.76 These data support the conclusion that
the major steel companies have committed substantially all of their
net cash flow to reinvestment and modernization, as required by the
statute.
Concerning the steel industry's statutorily required steps to re-
main internationally competitive, the ITC reported that a number of
major steel companies had taken steps to improve international com-
petitiveness. 77 These actions sought to (1) produce price-competitive
and quality-competitive products; (2) to control costs of production
73. Id.
74. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 806, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
75. Id.
76. Annual Survey Concerning Competitive Conditions in the Steel Industry and Indus-
try Efforts to Adjust and Modernize, United States International Trade Commission Report to
the President on Investigation No. 332-209 under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
USITC Pub. 2019, Inv. No. 332-209, at 71-73 (Sept. 1987) [hereinafter 1987 ITC STEEL SUM-
MARY]. See generally VRAs AND THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY, prepared for the Ameri-
can Iron and Steel Institute by Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett, Inc., Aug. 1988 [hereinafter VRAs
AND THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY] (reporting on the status of the domestic steel industry
and the effects of the VRAs).
77. 1987 ITC STEEL SUMMARY, supra note 76, at 71-73.
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including employment costs; and (3) to improve productivity.78
With respect to commitment of cash flow for worker retraining,
it is not clear that the statutory mandate has been fulfilled. The ITC
reported that in 1985-1986, of six major steel companies reporting
positive net cash flows, four indicated that retraining expenditures ex-
ceeded one percent of net cash flow. In 1986-1987, of the eight major
steel companies reporting positive cash flow, six indicated that re-
training expenditures exceeded one percent of cash flow. 79
c. Opposing Views
The four dissenters in the House Ways and Means Committee8o
argued that the legislation would be difficult to enforce and would
trigger a much higher level of imports than the President's program
anticipated. 8' Questioning the goals of reinvestment and retraining,
the dissenters expressed the view that government interference was
part of the problem and not part of the solution. 82 They asserted that
steel producers in the European Community suffered from too much
government interference, as "government[s] have never had very
great success in directing investment for private industry. ' 83
The dissenters also claimed that the legislation limits presidential
flexibility in rewarding competitive industries that may not have been
able to devote all of their resources to reinvestment. 84 Furthermore,
the Administration had no specific initiatives on how retraining was
to occur, and no data or justification to support the target import
penetration figure of seventeen percent.8 5
78. Id. at 93.
79. Id. at 71-73. The statute requires that "each of the major companies committed for
the applicable 12-month period not less than 1 percent of net cash flow to the retraining of
workers; except that this requirement may be waived by the President with respect to a major
company in non-compliance, if he finds unusual economic circumstances exist with respect to
that company ...." Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 806(b)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp.
1988) (emphasis added). The data for the remaining companies is "confidential" and not avail-
able in the 1987 ITC STEEL SUMMARY, supra note 76 (data omitted from pp. 77-92).
80. The four dissenters were: Rep. Bill Archer (R. Tex.), Rep. Barber B. Conable (R.
N.Y. (no longer in office)), Rep. Phil Crane (R. Ill.), and Rep. Bill Frenzel (R. Minn.). HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 59, at 5204.
81. See also Imported Steel Association President Warns Wire Producers Of Danger Of
VRA Extension, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 169 (Feb. 10, 1988) (stating that extension of the
VRA program will "divert attention from the nation's long-overdue effort to boost exports").
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 59, at 5204.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 5205.
1989]
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IV. MECHANICS OF THE STEEL VOLUNTARY
RESTRAINT AGREEMENT
VRAs have so far been negotiated with nineteen countries and
the European Community (separate agreements were negotiated with
Portugal and Spain).86 These agreements are tailored to each coun-
try, and take the form of market share agreements and quotas. The
product categories subject to limitation vary among the VRAs.
An instructive example of a typical Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ment is the U.S.-European Coal and Steel Community VRA. 87
A. The United States-European Coal and Steel Community
Voluntary Restraint Agreement
1. Basis and Conditions
Although each VRA states a different purpose, each is tailored to
carry out congressional policy as set forth in section 802 of the Steel
Import Stabilization Act.88 The stated objective of the arrangement is
to provide time for restructuring and thereby create a period of trade
stability. 89 Entry into and maintenance of the VRA is conditioned on
the withdrawal of the trade remedy petitions by United States steel
manufacturers. 90 If a petition is filed under any of the trade provi-
86. JUNE 1988 ITC STEEL REPORT, supra note 56, at vii. The following countries are
subject to various types of Voluntary Restraint Agreements. The first type of agreements are
market share agreements. Australia, Austria, Brazil, the European Community, Finland, Ja-
pan, Mexico, South Africa (steel imports from South Africa are reduced by the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which embargoes certain steel products), and South Korea are all
subject to market share agreements. Id.
The second type of agreements are quota agreements. Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and the
People's Republic of China are subject to steel quota agreements. Id.
The third type of agreements are semi-finished steel agreements. Australia, Brazil, the
European Community, Finland, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Vene-
zuela are signatories to semi-finished steel agreements. Id.
87. US-EC VRA, supra note 36.
88. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 802, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
89. US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,061.
90. Id. § 2. The prohibited petitions include: countervailing duty petitions, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); antidumping petitions, 19
U.S.C. § 1673-1675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); petitions for relief from fairly priced imports
under § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); actions under
§ 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, dealing with import restraints for national security
reasons, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982); petitions for relief from adverse foreign government action
in foreign matters, § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
and relief from unfair competition under § 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
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sions, and the parties agree that the investigation or litigation threat-
ens the attainment of the objective of the VRA, the VRA signatory is
entitled to terminate the agreement. 9'
2. Method of Operation
A products description section lists the concerned steel products
as described and classified by their Tariff Schedules of the United
States Annotated ("TSUSA") item numbers. 92 An export limits sec-
tion spells out the exact quantity limitations for foreign producer ex-
ports of steel products. 93 The usual method of export limitation
specified in the VRAs is through export licenses.
94
3. Calculation and Revision of United States Apparent
Consumption Forecast and of Export Limits
Under the VRAs each country receives a maximum export ton-
nage equal to a designated percentage of apparent domestic consump-
tion.95  This section details how the estimate of United States
apparent domestic consumption is made. The parties select an "in-
dependent forecaster" which provides the United States apparent do-
mestic consumption estimate. 96 Data Resources, Inc. of Washington,
D.C. is the "independent forecaster" accepted by the parties to all of
the agreements. 97 Provisional export ceilings, based on the domestic
consumption estimate, are revised when actual figures are available
and export levels are then adjusted retroactively.9"
4. Export Licenses and Certificates
This provision states that the VRA signatory will require export
licenses and certificates as a precondition for entry of steel products
into the United States. The required technical information to be in-
cluded in the license and a sample certificate are specified. 99 To en-
91. US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,061.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 49,062.
95. Id. at 49,061-62.
96. Id.
97. The figures come from American Iron and Steel Institute's Steel Import Monitoring
System monthly reports. These figures are then processed by Data Resources, Inc., a Wash-
ington econometrics firm. Telephone interview with Nicholas Tolerico, Director, Office of
Agreements and Compliance, Department of Commerce (Jan. 12, 1989).
98. US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,062.
99. Id. at 49,064.
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force this provision, the Customs Service was given the statutory
authority to require the presentation of a foreign export license as a
condition for entry into the United States. 1°°
5. Technical Adjustments and Short Supply
Adjustments to increase the volume of a particular import must
be offset by an equivalent volume reduction for another product cate-
gory for the same period. 1° 1 Adjustments under this provision are
limited to five percent. 102
If the United States determines that because of abnormal supply
or demand factors, the United States steel industry will not be able to
meet United States demand for a particular product, additional deliv-
eries are allowed.'0 3 This provision coincides with section 805(b)(3)
of the Steel Import Stabilization Act, which authorizes additional im-
ports where short supply or an emergency economic situation
exists. 104
6. Monitoring and Consultations
This section spells out information disclosure requirements for
export licenses and certificates issued for products governed by the
VRA. 10 5 Another section provides for quarterly consultations be-
tween the United States and the European Community on any matter
arising out of the agreement. 106 There are also sections that define the
territorial reach of the arrangement 10 7 and provide lists of persons to
notify under the agreement.10 8 VRAs with Brazil, Mexico, Trinidad/
Tobago and Venezuela are similar to the provisions of the U.S.-EC
VRA.
100. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1626 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See
Klockner, Inc. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1266, 1271, 1273 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (confirm-
ing executive authority for the validity of the U.S.-EC VRA).
101. US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,062.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Also in the News, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 235 (Feb. 24, 1988) (stating that short
supply petitions have been filed because of an insufficient supply of semifinished steel).
105. US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,062.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 49,062-63.
108. Id.
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B. Calculation of the Import Quota'09
The original VRA quotas were determined by the volume of im-
ports over an historical period. The VRA "negotiators" ' 1o deter-
mined how much each country produced, imported, and sold during
that period. Proportionate shares of the market were calculated with
respect to each country.
The United States then negotiated target import percentages
("export ceilings") with each foreign exporting country. Each coun-
try was allocated a percentage of United States apparent domestic
consumption, with the ultimate goal of keeping import penetration
from 17.0 to 20.2 percent."' Percentages differ as to each product
category. "12
C. Practical Problems
Several problems have arisen with the implementation of the
VRA program.
1. Long-term contracts were seriously impaired by the new export
restraints for suppliers from some countries. The long-term commit-
ments of suppliers from other countries were exempted from the
agreement.
2. As the quota percentages were not spelled out ahead of time, it
was originally assumed that the VRA import tonnage would be calcu-
lated by applying the percentages to 1984 tonnage figures. In most
quota regimes the percentage is applied against a number, and that
number is known before the quota period opens. The United States
government subsequently announced that the quotas would be recal-
culated quarterly, based on a percentage of current apparent domestic
109. Data on foreign trade imports and exports are compiled from "official" statistics of
the U.S. Department of Commerce, and statistics on shipments by domestic steel producers
are compiled by the American Iron and Steel Institute. JUNE 1988 ITC STEEL REPORT, supra
note 56, at ix.
110. The word "negotiated" used in connection with VRAs is ironic. VRAs are better
described as "unilateral export restraints," because the exporting country unilaterally imposes
restraints on exports, but under the threat of a unilateral embargo by the importing country.
The quota limit was essentially imposed by the United States on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Savage & Horlick, supra note 14, at 281. For lack of a better word, this article maintains the
conventional usage, which describes the process as a negotiation.
111. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 803(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
112. See, e.g., US-EC VRA, supra note 36, at 49,061 (specifying export ceilings for each
product category).
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consumption. 113 This method created two difficulties: First, the
number on which the quota is based changes every quarter and in the
quarter to which the quota applies. Second, the quotas must then be
adjusted retroactively. The benefit of this approach was that it per-
mitted the United States to avoid yearly percentage increases in the
quotas. It even permitted reductions in the event consumption
dropped.
3. There was some confusion connected with coverage and product
classification. During the VRA negotiation process, a consensus was
reached on which TSUSA categories would be covered in the VRA.
A product's TSUSA nomenclature, however, may not necessarily re-
flect its use. Confusion followed, as a result, as to which products
would be covered by a VRA. For example, under one VRA the ques-
tion arose whether transmission towers were covered in the agree-
ment. There had been no cases concerning the product, and the
manufacturers were not even aware of the pending VRA negotiations.
Since the product's TSUSA classification "steel structures" was in-
cluded in the VRA list, the product fell under a quota without having
been the focus of discussion by either party. In addition, the United
States uses a different classification scheme for its production than
that used for importation.
4. The VRA quota is measured by apparent domestic consumption,
not actual domestic consumption. The problem with this distinction
is that entries of stocks of finished products into warehouses are in-
cluded in the calculation of apparent domestic consumption, but
withdrawals are not. This is based on the convenient, but inaccurate,
assumption that the flow of goods from the ports and factories-
through the warehouses-to the users is constant. Not all goods
"shipped" are necessarily consumed in that period. Some are kept in
storage as a result of market forces. As distributors work off inven-
tory, consumption is understated. As distributors take on inventory,
it is overstated. Since inventories reflect interest rates and market ex-
pectations, the VRA calculations tend to change more abruptly than
real domestic consumption.
5. Some imported steel is eventually re-exported. Nevertheless, the
importing country may be limited by the quota, even though the steel
is not consumed in the United States. Procedures were created to
113. As an aside, it is unusual to base a quota on a floating number (the amount of domes-
tic consumption). Usually, quotas are based upon a set number.
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solve this problem, but delays and practical problems of record-keep-
ing prevented it from working well.
6. In the event of a short supply situation, section 805(b)(3) of the
Steel Import Stabilization Act allows the Secretary of Commerce to
permit the imports of additional quantities when conditions of short
supply or emergency economic conditions exist." 4 The evaluation of
short supply requests must take place quickly because of the emer-
gency nature of the request. The Department of Commerce has
needed more time to evaluate short supply requests than the private
sector has been comfortable with. Another problem is the definition
of scarcity. Scarcity is usually defined as excess demand. The Steel
Import Stabilization Act forbids the Secretary of Commerce from us-
ing economic scarcity (i.e. when domestic producers are unwilling to
supply products at low prices) as a reason for concluding that a short
supply situation exists." 5 On the other hand, it is not always clear
when "technical scarcity" is anything other than a reflection of under-
lying economics.
7. Not all countries are covered by VRAs. A few VRA countries
expected that the United States would bring non-VRA countries into
the scheme. Accordingly, while the main steel exporters are bound by
export limits, non-VRA countries may bring as much steel into the
U.S. as they please. In 1987, steel imports from non-VRA countries
were responsible for over half of the 10.8 percent rise in steel imports
from all countries combined." 6 Imports from non-VRA countries
also increased in the first quarter of 1988.' '
7
Also related to the problem of non-coverage is the problem of
transshipment. When a VRA country ships its steel to a non-VRA
country and that steel is then imported into the United States, it will
be in circumvention of the VRA limits, unless it is "substantially
transformed," thus changing its origin for customs purposes." 8 On
the other hand, if the good is "substantially transformed" (processed
114. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 805(b)(3), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
115. Id.
116. Steel Imports From Non- VRA Countries, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 967 (June 29,
1988).
117. Id.; See Imported Steel Association President Warns Wire Producers Of Danger Of
VRA Extension, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 169 (Feb. 10, 1988) (arguing that extension of the
VRAs will encourage foreign exporters to move their production facilities to non-VRA
countries).
118. See Industry Leaders Urge Administration To Take Tougher Imports Stance, Call For
More VRAs, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 461 (Apr. 9, 1986) (statement of Lynn Williams, Presi-
dent of the United Steelworkers Union, arguing that additional legislation is needed to "pro-
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into another product), the letter of the VRAs is not violated, but their
purposes are not advanced.1 19
V. THE STATE OF THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY
A. Steel Industry Efforts Toward Modernization and Retraining
As discussed above, the renewal of the VRA statutory authority
depends in part on efforts by the domestic steel industry to modernize
its facilities and retrain its labor force.120 Congress has suggested that
it would let this authority lapse if the steel industry did not modern-
ize. Therefore, it is important to review the U.S. steel industry's at-
tempts at modernization. The conditions of the domestic steel
industry are best summarized in six categories.
12'
1. Domestic Shipments
In the period from July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1986, the volume of
domestic shipments of carbon steel products increased by six percent,
while domestic shipments of specialty steel products declined by four
percent. 22 The quantities of shipments of the two categories declined
by nine percent for carbon steel, and five percent for specialty steel.'
23
In the following year, shipments of carbon steel decreased by five per-
cent, and specialty steel shipments increased by twelve percent.
24
The quantities shipped declined by one percent for carbon steel, and
declined by six percent for specialty steel. 25 The American Iron and
perly credit" a VRA country of origin with any steel mill item transformed in another
country).
119. An example of this problem is illustrated in Superior Wire v. United States, 669 F.
Supp. 472 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In Superior Wire, an importer of steel wire from Canada
protested against the exclusion of its shipment of wire rod originally manufactured in Spain.
Id. at 473-74. The Court of International Trade held that the steel wire rod was subject to a
Voluntary Restraint Agreement between the United States and Spain, because the product was
not "substantially transformed" in Canada to classify it as an imported good from Canada.
Id. at 480.
120. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 806, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
121. The ITC organizes its summaries of the conditions in the domestic steel industry
according to this scheme. Annual Survey Concerning Competitive Conditions In The Steel
Industry And Industry Efforts To Adjust And Modernize, USITC Pub. 1881, Inv. No. 332-
209, at vii-viii (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 ITC STEEL SUMMARY]; 1987 ITC STEEL SUM-
MARY, supra note 76, at ix-xi.
122. 1986 ITC STEEL SUMMARY, supra note 121, at vii. All of the data in this section for
the years 1985-86 are taken from this summary.
123. Id.
124. 1987 ITC STEEL SUMMARY, supra note 76, at ix. All of the data for years 1986-87
are taken from this summary.
125. Id.
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Steel Institute ("AISI") estimates that the VRAs have enabled United
States producers to ship eight million tons of additional steel.
126
2. Profits/Losses
Losses on carbon steel products increased in 1985-1986 from 3.7
percent to 4.1 percent, and increased again in 1986-1987 from 4.1 to
6.8 percent. Profits declined on sales of specialty steel items from 4.0
to 0.6 percent for 1985-1986, and profits on specialty steel increased
to 8.9 percent for the 1986-1987 period.
3. Companies Forced Into Bankruptcy
In 1985-1986, five steel companies filed for bankruptcy, including
LTV Corporation, the second largest domestic steel producer. Five
companies shut down all operations. In 1986-1987, three companies
filed for bankruptcy, and two companies shut down all operations.
AISI reports that twenty percent of the United States steel industry is
in Chapter 11 proceedings.
27
4. Steel Prices
Steel prices were down in the fourth quarter of 1985, but moved
back up during the first half of 1986. For the period 1986-1987, prices
increased three to six percent for carbon steel flat-rolled products.
Price levels were mixed in the area of long products (bar, rod and
structurals). Specialty steel prices declined in 1986-1987, while sheet
product prices remained stable. The ITC concluded generally that
factors such as the decline in the value of the United States dollar
(which has increased Japanese and European manufacturing costs in
terms of United States' dollars), production cutbacks by Japanese and
European producers, and reduced exports from Brazil, Korea and
Taiwan have reduced the international steel manufacturing price and
cost differentials. 28 AISI maintains, however, that steel prices are 85
percent of what they were five years ago. 1
29
126. VRAs AND THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY, supra note 76, at 2.
127. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 1, May 9, 1988.
128. 1987 ITC STEEL SUMMARY, supra note 76, at x.
129. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 1, May 9, 1988. Opponents of the VRA system main-
tain that a rise in steel prices will harm United States manufacturers that compete with foreign
manufacturers who have access to less expensive steel abroad. Head Of Industry Group Sees
Rise In Import Demand, Warns Against Continued Restraints, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1281
(Oct. 22, 1986).
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5. Employment
Trends of employment have continued downward dramatically
as a result of modernization 130 on the part of the steel industry. Em-
ployment in the industry declined seven percent in 1985-1986 and de-
clined an additional sixteen percent in 1986-1987. Employment in
carbon steel pipe and tube facilities and in carbon steel plate opera-
tions were down forty-eight and forty-four percent, respectively.
During the 1985-1987 time frame, the largest steel producers negoti-
ated new labor contracts, reducing hourly compensation and limiting
the extent to which steel producers can contract-out work. Labor
productivity increased eight to fourteen percent for the years 1982-
1987.131 The ITC concluded, however, that the relative cost competi-
tiveness of domestic producers has improved because of the decline in
the United States dollar and increases in United States labor
productivity. 132
6. Restructuring
The industry has restructured its operations in the years 1985-
1987. Raw steel capacity declined 3.2 percent in 1985-1986 and 9.8
percent in 1986-1987 in the carbon steel sector. In the specialty steel
sector, capacity declined 15.5 percent in 1985-1986. Capital expendi-
tures declined twenty-five percent in 1985-1986 and declined 36 per-
cent in 1986-1987.133
According to AISI, however, the steel industry shut down over
400 steel manufacturing facilities with capacity in excess of forty mil-
lion tons. AISI claims that despite losses of $12 billion and cash flow
from steel operations of only $4.3 billion, U.S. producers invested
$7.8 billion in steel modernization. 34
B. Political Pressure From the Domestic Steel Industry
AISI has stated that it wishes to continue the VRA system after
the statutory expiration date and will seek to expand the system to
130. The U.S. steel industry has turned to "high tech" as part of its effort to modernize.
AISI "Steel Comments," no. 1, May 9, 1988.
131. VRAs AND THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY, supra note 76, at 40-41. See Study
Asserts Administration Neglect Partly At Fault For Import Surge, Industry Weakness, 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 126 (Jan. 22, 1986) (asserting that Reagan Administration failure to "prop-
erly" implement the VRA system has prevented the rehiring of 28,000 steel workers in 1985).
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 122, 124.
134. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 1, May 9, 1988.
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include non-VRA countries. 35 AISI believes that the VRA system
has helped to control "the wave of steel imports . . . often illegally
priced"' 36 and thinks that the VRAs provide for a climate of "fair
trade and legal trading practices."' 137 In the absence of a VRA exten-
sion plan, AISI has said publicly that the industry is prepared to
"flood" the ITC with trade cases.' 3 8 In evaluating the future of the
VRA, it is important to note that AISI has significant allies in Con-
gress, especially among members of the Congressional Steel
Caucus. 
39
First, AISI argues that international competitiveness has im-
proved as a result of the VRAs.'40 AISI cites four measurements to
support this proposition.' 4' In a comparison of estimated hourly em-
ployment costs in 1984 and 1987, the United States steel industry has
held down increases in labor costs to $1.60, while labor costs in Japan,
West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France have increased sig-
nificantly. 42 According to the AISI study, the United States has re-
mained internationally competitive in labor productivity, total costs
per ton shipped, and total landed costs per ton shipped.' 43 In sum,
AISI maintains that the VRA program has given the United States
steel industry time to regain its footing in domestic and foreign
markets. 44
Second, despite the improvements for which the VRA program is
said to be responsible, AISI feels that the United States steel industry
continues to need the program. First, there were significant start-up
135. Remarks of Thomas C. Graham, Chairman of the American Iron and Steel Institute
at the AISI General Meeting in Washington, D.C., at 5-6 (May 18, 1988).
136. Id. at 2. AISI's use of the word "illegal" to describe goods imported at less than fair
value is imprecise. A final order in an antidumping proceeding applies only to future entries.
Sanctions for earlier entries are not imposed. An importer is free to import merchandise sub-
ject to an antidumping order. The conduct is therefore not illegal; it is subject only to possible
compensating duties.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. See 133 CONG. REC. H7918-19 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1987) (stating that the House Steel
Caucus has helped to create the trigger price mechanism, the Steel Import Stabilization Act,
and the VRAs).
140. Lynn R. Williams, the President of the United Steel Workers Union, stated recently
that "The Voluntary Restraint Agreements have been a principal element in the modest recov-
ery of the steel industry." Free Trade Is Ideology Not Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, § III,
at 2, col. 3.
141. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 2, May 9, 1988.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 3, May 9, 1988.
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problems connected with modernization. 145  Imports were higher
than expected, and domestic producers suffered a decline in sales as a
result. 146 Second, the industry is still in a fragile financial condi-
tion. 147 The industry is barely breaking even on sales, and lacks ac-
cess to capital. These factors limit modernization.
48
Third, AISI makes a national security/national interest argu-
ment: "Steel is a unique commodity that is fundamental to the econ-
omy of every modem industrialized country in the world... it is vital
to national security and critical to manufacturing, mining, construc-
tion, energy production, transportation and agriculture."' 149 Steel also
plays a crucial role in restructuring America's industrial
infrastructure. 1 50
Fourth, because of this internationally recognized need for steel,
the steel industry in foreign countries receives governmental subsidies.
The governments of Japan, Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, and the Euro-
pean Community are said to heavily subsidize their domestic steel
producers. 51 According to AISI, the United States does not,1 52 thus
putting United States producers at a competitive disadvantage.
53
Fifth, AISI cites a lack of success in gaining relief from cases
brought under United States international trade laws. In the 1960s,
United States steel companies obtained relief in only eight out of 300
antidumping cases.' 54 Relief obtained in the mid-1970s by the spe-
cialty steel producers under a section 201 petition was temporary, as
the industry was again in crisis by 1982.155 AISI also cites the failure
of the TPM as an example of the lack of success under United States
trade laws. 15
6
Sixth, the United States steel industry cites closed markets (par-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 4, May 9, 1988.
150. Id.
151. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 7, May 9, 1988.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. AISI "Steel Comments," no. 5, May 9, 1988. This lack of success in obtaining relief
under the international trade laws does not necessarily mean that the steel industry is entitled
to special treatment from the government. The lack of success could mean that the industry
simply did not make a convincing demonstration of injury or unfair trade practices, and there-
fore should not be entitled to a VRA program.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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ticularly in the European Community and Japan) and unfair trade
practices as another reason why the United States steel industry is not
internationally competitive. 157
VI. WHY THE VRA REGIME IS HERE TO STAY
Quota regimes are roundly criticized by economists and explic-
itly discouraged by the GATT.158 It is not evident, at least at first,
why there is such resistance to them. As a matter of comparative
statics, for any given tariff burden, it is possible to invent a quota that
will achieve the same trade-restrictive results, 159 at the same level of
economic inefficiency.
Why, then, are tariffs so highly preferred? The answer is that
changes in the market-the events that upset the comparative stat-
ics-make the results of tariffs and quotas much different. Shifts in
supply and demand can be accommodated by changes in both price
and quantity under a tariff regime, whereas a quota requires that the
entire shift be accommodated by the price term alone. 16° As a result,
during times of rising demand, quotas thwart consumers and induce
more and more resources to enter inefficiently into the (domestic) pro-
duction of the product. 161 Businesses, aware of the potentially broad
swings in revenue that can occur under quota protection, will then
organize production to be flexible-to increase or decrease production
rapidly, in response to the large price movements that might occur. 162
As a result, average production costs will be higher, as firms invest
less in fixed factors and spend more on variable inputs.
This structural criticism is the central economic objection to quo-
tas. As a policy, the traditional criticism of quota regimes as tempo-
rary analgesia for a trade problem is that the symptoms are treated,
157. AISI best summarizes its case as follows:
While the current VRAs don't cover a number of major foreign suppliers and haven't
achieved the President's "expected results," they have: (1) been the most successful
steel import relief program to-date; (2) helped bring down the import market share
from about 30 percent at year-end 1984 to around 21 percent in 1987; and (3) al-
lowed domestic steel producers to make substantial progress toward modernizing
and restructuring facilities.
AISI "Steel Comments," no. 5, May 9, 1988.
158. GATT, supra note 14, art. XI.
159. I. PEARCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 250 (1966).
160. By definition, the quantity term cannot expand under a quota. If the shift would
cause a contraction of demand to a quantity inside the quota limit, then the quota would be
inactive.
161. I. PEARCE, supra note 159, at 254.
162. L. YEAGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS 115-16 (1976).
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but the disease is ignored. The conditions creating the need for the
quotas do not change, so the quotas have a persistent, tenacious qual-
ity about them. The VRA legislation tried to cure this objection by
making long term adjustment a precondition to relief.' 63 Neverthe-
less, quota regimes seem attractive to businessmen even when the un-
derlying situation has improved.
In addition, quota systems destroy the mechanism that transmits
reliable economic signals in a free market regime.l 64 Thus, even one
who wants to dismantle a quota system will find it difficult to deter-
mine when market conditions favor changes, relaxations, or deregula-
tion, or how the adjustments should be made. What the market tells
us is untrustworthy because of the distortive quota. For those who
suffered through the last decade in the steel industry, an imposed cer-
tainty, even a sub-optimal one (the VRA), is better than the uncer-
tainty of the free-market.
The natural tendency of quotas is not only to stay in force too
long, but also to expand their coverage to related products. The rea-
son for this is simple: if quotas do their job properly, prices will rise,
thus increasing the input prices for the users of the product. For ex-
ample, a quota-induced price increase in steel coils will clearly raise
the cost of production of steel pipes and tubes. This will make pipe
and tube manufacturers less competitive with foreign competitors,
who are still buying coils at world market prices. If the producers of
pipes and other finished steel products obtain quota protection as a
result, then the auto parts industry (for example) will suffer a loss of
competitiveness with respect to foreign suppliers. If there is little
political will to resist the natural resort to quotas, then quotas can
spread through a sector like an infection.
VII. DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES: A BETTER APPROACH
Quota protection is an economic benefit to a manufacturer, paid
for by his customers and some of his foreign competitors. 65 In this
163. Steel Import Stabilization Act, § 806, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988).
164. I. PEARCE, supra note 159, at 251.
165. The losers among foreign producers are those whose revenues drop because quantity
sold falls off proportionately more than prices rise. How much the foreign suppliers lose de-
pends upon elasticities of demand and supply. Those that do receive quota allocations without
paying for them realize corresponding increases in costs. Beyond that, the allocation of quotas
on the basis of historical performance tends to reward the traditional suppliers at the expense
of new entrants. The amount of support for VRAs among foreign producers suggests that
revenues may rise for most traditional producers. This implies that the costs of the system will
be imposed on United States purchasers of steel products and new entrants from abroad.
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sense, it constitutes an externality similar to pollution, i.e., it creates
social costs not paid for through the pricing mechanism. Quota pro-
tection is a political decision, yet politicians are not held accountable
for it. 166 The burden is reflected in prices, not taxes. Such quotas act
as subsidies to manufacturers, except there is no accounting mecha-
nism to measure how much is spent or to determine whether the bene-
ficiaries continue to be deserving.
Few argue with the first two propositions of the syllogism that
created the VRAs, although they may be controversial in their details:
1. The domestic steel industry cannot compete on a price basis
with certain foreign suppliers who enjoy advantages (natural or ar-
tificial) over domestic producers.
2. The domestic steel industry's continued viability at some level
of output is essential to the nation's strength, security, and techno-
logical development.
3. Therefore, the United States government must restrict
imports.
An equally plausible conclusion to this argument is:
3. Therefore, Congress should allocate taxpayer funds to protect
and revitalize the domestic steel industry.
If a domestic subsidy were granted to the steel industry and paid
out of tax revenues rather than paid as price inflation, the same per-
sons who now fund the quota system would wind up paying for the
subsidy. The set of consumers are, in the main, the same as the set of
taxpayers, especially when the product is as widely used as steel. The
differences between subsidization and quotas are:
1. Under subsidization, political accountability remains with
Congress. Therefore, praise and blame will not be misplaced when
the effects of the policy are felt.
2. Steel will not be made artificially expensive by subsidies, nor
will subsidies result in inappropriate resource allocations. If any-
thing, through the process of "rationalization," resources overall
should flow from steel to other sectors, not the other way
around. 167
166. I. PEARCE, supra note 159, at 252.
167. This is not to deny that new investment is essential to the long-term survival of the
United States steel industry. Congress recognized that such innovation is overdue. Steel Im-
port Stabilization Act, § 802(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. 1988). On the other hand, it is not
efficient for the United States to insist on producing all of its steel, when production costs in
the United States exceed prices on world markets. The logic of free trade-that it is better to
import if you can buy an item more cheaply than you can make it-should be applied once
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3. The users of steel products will not become less competitive in
their own markets, and thus they will not clamor for protection of
their own.
4. Domestic subsidies are more consistent with international
norms than are quota systems, which GATT specifically disal-
lows. 168 Quota systems, when they exist legally (for safeguard pur-
poses, for example) are compensable to trading partners. Domestic
subsidies are legal in all events, and are compensable under the
GATT subsidies code only when their external effect causes mate-
rial injury (under the countervailing duty provisions), 169 serious
prejudice, nullification or impairment of commitments, etc. (under
the dispute settlement provisions of the subsidies code).17 0
The domestic industry opposes the subsidy option because it al-
lows more government influence over the companies. Furthermore,
benefits can be limited and allocated with more precision. The benefit
of a quota regime is that it tends to raise price levels generally, with-
out discriminating among different types of products. Under a sub-
sidy regime, no short supply procedures would be required to provide
fine-tuning. On the contrary, over-supply conditions would have to
be adjusted through a targeted reduction of incentives. Neither sys-
tem is perfect, both systems will create inefficiencies and misalloca-
tions. However, the risk of error in the subsidy system is borne by the
industry. Under quotas, error is translated into needlessly high prices
and scarcities of goods not worthy of protection. The consumer ulti-
mately pays more dearly for this imprecision.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Economic conditions and policy considerations suggest that the
VRA system will be extended. Historically, steel production has re-
quired relatively high fixed investment. Moreover, as the global steel
industry adopts modern production technologies, variable costs, espe-
cially labor, will become proportionally low. The relative reduction in
variable costs will provide added incentive for each company to signif-
icantly expand its production capacity and output. The result will be
national interests have been protected by guaranteeing a market for the (appropriately dimen-
sioned) domestic industry.
168. GATT, supra note 14, art. XI.
169. Id art. VI.
170. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties of 1979, 31 U.S.T.
513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. (1980).
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an even greater excess supply of steel and further erosions in price
levels.
Thus, world-wide modernization in the steel industry will result
in continued low prices and profit margins unless some kind of quan-
titative rationalization is imposed. The policy question of how gov-
ernments should establish rules to maintain minimum prices remains.
Despite the fact that most governments have not yet developed mini-
mum pricing systems, it is unlikely that foreign steel industries will
pressure their governments to seek a free market scheme in steel
trade.
The current system of voluntary restraint agreements is a short-
term, ad hoc answer to the problem of controlling the quantity of steel
imported into the domestic market. Nonetheless, current economic
conditions confronting the United States steel industry, combined
with political pressure from within and without that industry, render
it likely that the VRA system will continue. In addition, such quotas
may increase the likelihood that the VRA system will be expanded to
include non-VRA countries, and perhaps more products.
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